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tetapi dengan ganjaran yang ditetapkan untuk kesemua kakitangan kerajaan yang 
layak untuk menerima pencen. Di bawah skim ini, kakitangan kerajaan tidak perlu 
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dan jurang kewangan. Langkah- langkah ini akan membuahkan hasil sekiranya 
xvii 
 
diperkenalkan secara berperingkat dan hanya melibatkan kakitangan sektor 
perkhidmatan awam yang baru. Namun begitu, defisit pencen dan jurang kewangan 
hanya akan dapat diperbaiki sekiranya di samping langkah-langkah yang dicadangkan 
di atas diambil, saiz sektor perkhidmatan awam dikurangkan dan faedah persaraan 
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xviii 
 
THE LONG TERM FINANCIAL SUSTAINABILITY OF THE CIVIL 
SERVICE PENSION SCHEME IN MALAYSIA 
 
ABSTRACT 
CSPS is a non-contributory and a defined-benefit pension scheme for all government 
employees who are eligible for pension. Under this scheme, the employees do not 
contribute for their pension and all expenditure is borne by the government through 
tax revenues. With the growing number of public sector employees, their longer life 
expectancy, and the expanding benefits under the CSPS, spending on pensions has 
been escalating. The main objective of the study was to assess its financial 
sustainability in terms of the pension deficit (ratio of pension deficit to total wages) 
and financial gap (pension deficit as a percentage of GDP). A country specific model 
that allows the projections of future expenditures and revenues over a period of 75 
years was used to undertake this exercise under eight alternative scenarios. The 
findings indicate that if no intervention is made, the pension fund becomes 
unsustainable with both the pension deficit and the financial gap increasing at an 
increasing rate over time. On the other hand, if an increase in retirement age is 
combined with a reduction in replacement rate, and an increase in contribution rate, 
the pension scheme becomes more sustainable by delaying the pension deficit and a 
financial gap over a longer time period. These measures are best introduced in phases 
and applied only to new civil service recruits. However, the pension deficit and 
financial gap can only be effectively overcome if, along with the above measures, the 
size of the civil service is cut and benefits of the pension scheme are substantially 
modified. These are measures more difficult to implement. 
1 
 
CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.0  Introduction 
 
Civil service pension schemes are separate pension schemes for government 
employees or the public sector. The civil service pension in Malaysia was founded in 
Britain in 1810 and government employees were among the first to be covered by the 
government sponsored schemes (Palacios & Whitehouse, 2006). Many of the British 
colonies like Malaya (Malaysia, after 1963) inherited its underlying model of 
generous and non-contributory design (Manaf, 2010; Sujata, 2007). The Civil Service 
Pension Scheme (CSPS)1 in Malaysia is a defined benefit (DB) scheme solely for 
government workers who meet the eligibility criteria and it is currently financed as a 
“pay as you go scheme” (PAYG) from general revenue although this is expected to 
change in the near future and be financed from the pension fund called the “Kumpulan 
Wang Pesaraan” or Retirement Fund Incorporated (KWAP) (KWAP, 2013).  
 
The DB scheme has a benefit structure that depends on final salary and length of 
service as opposed to a defined contribution (DC) scheme which is solely dependent 
on contributions and returns on assets accumulated by the fund (Barr & Diamond, 
2006; McGilllivary, 2006). PAYG are pensions paid out of current revenue rather 
than accumulated funds (Barr & Diamond, 2009) while funding refers to setting aside 
assets for future consumption. Given the experiences of many developed countries 
                                               
1 The structure of the CSPS is explained in detail in Chapter 2.  
2 
 
that are facing rising public expenditure as a result of rising life expectancy (Palacios 
& Whitehouse, 2006; Holzmann & Hinz, 2005, Van der Auwera, 2006) the financial 
sustainability of defined benefit (DB) schemes is of crucial importance because 
benefits are dependent on the ability to raise revenues in PAYG schemes, or returns 
on investment in funded schemes (Barr & Diamond, 2009). As most civil service 
pension schemes are based on defined benefit, the changing demographic profile and 
rising fiscal costs have compelled many countries to re-examine their pensions and 
consider reforms. At present, both developed and developing countries are reforming 
their civil service pension schemes because of these pressures.  
  
Financial sustainability2 of a pension scheme refers to its capacity to meet both the 
short-term and long-term commitments in paying pensions. The short-term 
commitment refers to the ability to finance the current explicit debt which is paying 
current pensioners, by taking into account the current assets and liabilities. The long 
term commitments, also known as implicit debt, refers to the ability to finance future 
payments of pensions that take into account the future expenditures and revenues 
(Barr & Diamond, 2009; Holzmann et.al., 2004). In the Malaysian case, the long term 
sustainability depends on the ability of the pension fund under KWAP to sustain 
paying out pensions to current and future retirees. The concern here is that the CSPS, 
without any contribution from the employees, would eventually encounter problems 
in accumulating financial reserves for investing and may not get the required returns 
for continuous payment (Lee, 1997).  To be financially sustainable means revenues 
must be sufficient to cover the liabilities. The ability to finance future expenditures 
will depend on the contribution to the funds, the interest earned on the assets, and the 
                                               
2 The concept of financial sustainability is explained and discussed further in Chapter 3. 
3 
 
pension promises to the current and future retirees. A pension fund deficit would 
mean that the collections in terms of contributions and returns on the fund do not 
match the payments to pensions. When a pension deficit occurs the pension scheme 
becomes financially unsustainable and thus creates a pension debt that the 
government has to finance through its revenue or by raising taxes. This is because the 
pension system is safeguarded by the Federal Constitution and solvency (assets must 
equal liabilities) is guaranteed by the government (Lee, 1997).  When the pension 
deficit becomes too large and persists, the entire pension scheme becomes 
unsustainable and this would require reviewing and changing pension parameters to 
ensure sustainability. 
 
Forecasting models of future payments and collections into the future enables one to 
estimate the pension deficit (Becker & Paltsev, 2001). A rising pension deficit over 
the years would indicate that the fund is inadequate to make payments and possibly 
not sustainable. A financial gap in the funding is expressed as the pension deficit as a 
percentage of GDP.  This gap will clearly show the amount of pension debt as a share 
of GDP, the government will need to finance when the pension fund falls short of 
liabilities (Yi, 2011). Although, the push for reforms may be strong, some 
considerations have to be given to the multiple objectives3 of a pension system such 
as consumption smoothing and as insurance for uncertainty and risks (Barr & 
Diamond, 2006). Other primary goals like ensuring adequacy, affordability and 
robustness are also important in the framework for reforms as noted by the World 
Bank (Holzmann & Hinz, 2005).  
                                               
3 The multiple objectives and primary goals are basic concepts of the pension system. They are  
defined and explained at length in Chapter 3 
4 
 
Many of the reforms are aimed at reducing costs and reducing disparity between 
public and private pension schemes so as to increase labour mobility between the two 
sectors (Asher, 2000; Palacios & Whitehouse, 2006). The reforms carried out are both 
parametric and systemic. The parametric approach focuses on changing the key 
parameters: like changing the retirement age, increasing contribution, tightening the 
eligibility criteria and changing the method of indexation to protect against inflation4 
while systemic reform refers to changing the scheme from DB to DC.  
 
Having encountered fiscal stress during times of recession in the 1980s, Malaysia has 
already initiated several reform measures but the nagging question of sustainability 
still prevails (Lee, 1997). One of the pressing issues concerning the CSPS in Malaysia 
is that the fiscal burden of financing this scheme has become significant and may 
crowd out other expenditures. This is because when pension deficit rises, the amount 
of government revenue that needs to be allocated for pensions would also rise.   
 
Experiences of reforms in the civil service pension system undertaken by both 
developed and developing countries are worthy of assessment in order to identify the 
lessons for Malaysia. Yet, there are very few published studies on the design and the 
required reforms of the civil service pension scheme in Malaysia as compared to many 
other countries (Lee, 1997; Ibrahim & Siri, 2012). In contrast, there is a voluminous 
literature on the Malaysian Employees Provident Fund (EPF), which is a pension 
scheme for the private sector (for example, Lee, 2001; Narayanan, 2002; Holzmann, 
2014). 
                                               
4 Pensions can be indexed to inflation or increases in wages. In Malaysia, an annual adjustment of 2 
percent is made to account for inflation. 
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The present study will therefore investigate the issues that accentuate the need for 
reform and also provide inputs for fine tuning the system.  
 
1.1 Problems in Financial Sustainability of Pension Scheme 
 
There are number of issues in the Malaysian context that pose challenges to the long 
term financial sustainability of the pension system and consequently underscore the 
need for reform of the CSPS: the changing demographic structure, the rising size of 
pension recipients, the widening of pension coverage, the rising pension bill. There 
are further concerns related to disparities in the obligations and benefits between the 
CSPS and the EPF (the major pension scheme protecting retired private sector 
employees), and the institutional capacity to support reform. Each is discussed in turn.  
 
1.1.1 Changing Demography- Increase in Life Expectancy 
 
Increasing life expectancy places additional financial strain on the CSPS. The higher 
the life expectancy, the longer the payments for pensions from the time of retirement 
to the time one dies.  The difference in life expectancy and the retirement age for 
Malaysia was considerably high in 2007. The life expectancy at birth in 2007 was 73 
whereas the retirement age for government employees was 55. The difference of 18 
years was the highest compared to China (13 years) and Thailand (15.6 years) but 
equaled to that of Singapore (Park & Estrada, 2012: 8-12). Additionally, civil servants 
tended to have longer life expectancy than the general population, based on evidence 
from developing countries (Palacios & Whitehouse, 2006).  In 2014, with the 
retirement age raised to 60 and life expectancy at 74, the length in pension payout 
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was reduced to 14 years. Parametric reform such as this in the civil service pension 
scheme may induce other costs such as rising wage bill along with longer employment 
years, leading to even higher pensions in the future (Palacios & Whitehouse, 2006). 
The life expectancy is expected to rise to 80.1 years between 2045 and 2050 (Park & 
Estrada, 2012) and this also has implications on the cost of financing pensions and 
the sustainability of the pension system.  
 
1.1.2  Rising Share of Pensioners and the Fiscal Impact 
 
The rising share of pensioners in the population contributes to higher pension costs 
and thus higher fiscal strain. On average 15,000 to 17,000 employees retire in a year 
(Sujata, 2007); in addition, the number of dependents5 has also risen. The initial 
design of CSPS during British era did not include dependents but over the years the 
CSPS has evolved to include more recipients (Sujata, 2007).  
 
Table 1.1 indicates that between 2002 and 2014, the number of pensioners grew by 
4.12 percent per year while dependents grew at a slower rate of 2 percent per annum. 
Thus pension recipients as a whole (pensioners and dependents), grew at an annual 
average rate of 3.4 percent. For the same period, the average growth per annum of tax 
revenue was 7.5 percent (MOF, various years). In striking contrast, pension payments 
during this period recorded a growth rate of 9.2 per cent per annum, outstripping the 
growth of both pension recipients as well as tax revenue. On a per capita basis, too, 
pension payments registered an annual average growth rate (5.6 percent) that was well 
                                               
5 Dependents are widows/ widowers and children or parents of single employees who receive 
derivative pension. 
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ahead of the growth of total pension recipients. Clearly, if this trend continues, the 
CPS scheme will become financially unsustainable6. 
 
  Note: 1 Includes gratuity payments (or lump sum payments received upon retirement) 
                   2 Estimate 
 
There are at least two reasons for the rapid growth of pension payments; first, the 
periodic adjustment upward in pensions not only to account for inflation but also to 
parallel wage adjustments for the employees. In 2000, a 10 percent increase in salary 
was given to all employees across the board and following that, another increase was 
made in 2002. A substantial revision in salary took place in 2007, in which the support 
group 28 (secondary school and lower certificate graduates) received 35 percent 
increase and the support group 1(diploma and high school graduates) was given 25 
                                               
6 A crude elasticity of pension expenditure, with respect to changes in pension recipients 
(%⧍ܲܧ/%⧍ܴܲ) for this period has a value of about 3.9 with reference to Table 1.1 over the period, 
2002 to 2014 [(16167-5134)/ 5134] /[(9609549-392265)/392265] x 100. This suggests that for every 
one percent increase in pension recipients during this period, pension payments increased by nearly 
3.9 percent. 
7 The data for pensioners and pension recipients between 2002 and 2004 were from JPA annual 
report 2006; for years 2005 to 2012, the data were from JPA annual report 2012, and data for the 
period, 2013 to 2014, were from the 2014 annual report. Pension expenditure was obtained from 
MOF (various years) 
8 Support groups, management group and JUSA are explained in the civil service workforce structure 
in Chapter 2.  
Table 1.1 Number of Pension Recipients and Expenditure on Pensions 
Year Number of pensioners 
Number of 
dependents 
Total 
recipients 
Pension 
expenditure 
(million)1 
Per capita  
expenditure 
2002 263,720 128,545 392,265 5,134 13,088 
2003 280,196 131,097 411,293 5,870 14,272 
2004 296,966 133,448 430,414 6,060 14,079 
2005 291,554 13,4019 425,573 6,809 16,000 
2006 309,904 13,7364 447,268 7,008 15,668 
2007 330,356 14,0540 470,899 8,251 17,522 
2008 346,975 14,3601 490,576 10,022 20,429 
2009 356,652 14,6437 503,089 10,146 20,167 
2010 372,849 14,,9436 522,285 11,515 22,047 
2011 396,528 15,2142 548,670 13,565 24,723 
2012 411,729 15,3954 565,683 14,079 24,888 
2013 418,940 162,080 581,020 14,842 25,545 
2014 445,371 164,178 609,549 16,1672 26,523 
Sources: JPA, various years 7 ; MOF various years 
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percent increase. The management group and JUSA had 15 percent and 7.5 percent 
increases, respectively (Manaf, 2010). In 2012, the salaries of all the various groups 
were increased between 7 to 13 percent (Ahmad et al., 2012). Second, the scope of 
pension payments has been broadened to include more dependents as mentioned 
earlier.  
 
The “ultimate fiscal effect will, [of course], depend on government hiring practices” 
(Palacios and Whitehouse, 2006: 38). In Malaysia, the New Economic Policy (NEP)9 
and subsequent initiatives made the public sector a major avenue to provide 
employment for the Malays and other Bumiputra (Embong, 1996; Khoo, 2005; 
Menon, 2009; Manaf, 2010; Lau, 2013; Lee, 2012). The employment in the public 
sector grew at an annual average rate of 4.6 percent from 1971 to 198010.  
 
Growth in public sector employment slowed down when privatization was introduced 
officially in 1983, and the Privatisation Master Plan was unveiled in 1991, as part of 
the Sixth Malaysia Plan (1991-95)11. The slowing down of public sector employment 
was, however, evident much earlier during the Fifth Plan (1986-90). It persisted 
through the   Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Plan periods (1991-2005). Thus, for the 
twenty year period, from 1986 to 2005, growth in public sector employment was 
reduced to a mere 1.2 percent per annum. The privatization policy came about for two 
reasons; one, the government realized that the burden of financing a large public 
                                               
9 NEP was introduced for a 20 year period from 1971 to 1990 and sought to eliminate the 
identification of race with occupation, and alleviate poverty.  Refer to Appendix 3 for changes in 
ethnic composition in public sector. 
10 All growth rates in this study are continuously compounded rates. The employment growth was 
computed from the data in Appendix 1. 
11 During the Sixth Plan period (1991-1995) alone, 29 government agencies were privatized and the 
significant drop in the employment came from the privatization of the Telecommunications 
Department, National Electricity Board and Post Service Department. (Manaf, 2010) 
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sector was risky; second, it was one way to ensure Bumiputera attainment of 30 
percent of economic share in the corporate sector as envisaged under the NEP 
(Singaravello, 2012).  
 
The employment trend in the public sector began to rise again with the advent of 
government-linked companies (GLCs) participating in the private sector 
(Singaravelloo, 2012). The growth in public sector employment recovered under the 
Ninth Plan (2006-2010) to register an annual average growth rate 3.3 percent. This 
trend is expected to have continued under the Tenth Plan (2011-2014). 
 
It is therefore clear that the hiring practices in the public sector are influenced by 
government policies and plans. The hiring decisions in recent years may not add to 
the current burden of pension spending but will eventually lead to a higher implicit 
cost through future retirees.  
 
The ratio of civil service employees to population in 2012 indicated that it was the 
highest for Malaysia (5.0 percent to a population of 28.8 million), when compared to 
other ASEAN countries like Thailand (3.0 percent of 68 million), Indonesia (1.9 
percent of 237.6 million), Philippines (1.5 percent of 92.3 million), Vietnam (2.2 
percent of 87.8 million) and Singapore (2.4 percent of 5.2 million) (ASEAN, 2012).  
 
The pension spending for Malaysia was about 1.8 percent of Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP), 8.5 percent of operating expenditure, and 11.1 percent of tax revenue  in 
201412 (MOF, various years). Comparable figures were  0.5 percent of GDP in 
                                               
12 Refer to Appendix 2 for the changes in spending as a proportion of GDP and revenue. 
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Indonesia, about 0.8 percent for the Philippines, and about  2 percent for the  OECD 
countries in 2006 (Whitehouse, 2010).  
 
It is evident that Malaysia has a larger public sector and higher pension spending in 
comparison to Indonesia and the Philippines. When expenditures are rising and 
revenues are inadequate, reforms to the civil service pension scheme become 
imperative.  
 
1.1.3 Fiscal Capacity 
 
Barr and Diamond (2009: 16) argue that spending on pensions “must be compatible 
with a country’s ability to finance the consumption of retirees, the investment from 
which future economic growth derives, and the government’s ability to raise 
revenues.” Interestingly, in Malaysia, federal government expenditures, deficit and 
debt have been rising almost continuously since the 1970s (Narayanan, 2012)13. The 
federal government debt was estimated at 53.2 percent of GDP in 2014 (MOF, 2014). 
The debt poses a risk to monetary stability and the ability to meet repayment 
obligations. This, in turn, may be worrisome to foreign investors (Reinhart & Rogoff, 
2010). The continuous deficit springs mainly from operating expenditures.  The 
largest component of the operating expenditure consists of emoluments (salary and 
allowances)14 paid to government employees; it averages to one quarter or more of 
the operating expenditures. In 2011, emoluments were about 27.5 percent of operating 
                                               
13  Although Malaysia experienced budget deficits from 1971 to 2014, and budget surpluses only 
between 1993 and 1997, concerns about rising budget deficit were raised only since 2003. Prior to 
this, the expenditures were seen as a necessity to meet NEP goals.  
14 Emoluments include salary, civil service allowances, housing allowance and cost of living 
allowance. 
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expenditure and has been rising over the years - 29.2 percent in 2012, 28.9 percent in 
2013 and estimated to be 29.6 percent in 2014 (MOF, various years). The large 
emolument expenditures are also influenced, as noted before, by rising employment 
and salary increases in the public sector. Salaries increases are, however, not 
determined by market forces or productivity. Between 1998 and 2007, for example, 
national labour productivity grew at a rate of 2.9 percent per year while civil service 
emoluments grew much faster, at 9.9 percent per annum (Narayanan, 2012). The 
growth of pensions and gratuities during the same period was 8.5 percent (see 
Appendix 1). Thus, both the growth of wages and pension payments outpaced 
productivity growth. 
 
At the macro level also, the fiscal picture continues to raise concerns. Malaysia has 
not been very successful in balancing expenditures and revenues. Between 2000 and 
2007, when the budget deficit was reduced from 5.8 percent to 3.2 percent of GDP, 
there was no reduction in operating expenditure; instead, development expenditure 
was cut (Narayanan, 2012). Development expenditure contributes to the productive 
capacity of the country while operating expenditure finances current consumption. 
Reflecting on the importance of economic growth and the ability to raise revenue as 
mentioned by Barr and Diamond (2009), a large spending on pension is not 
sustainable. In fact, it may be a factor  in triggering periods of crisis and inducing 
governments to impose more taxes or cut expenditures elsewhere (Holzmann & Hinz, 
2005). In Malaysia, it is obvious that efforts to raise revenue are being made through 
the implementation of the goods and services taxes (GST), but not much has been 
seen in terms of revamping the expenditures on emoluments or pensions or addressing 
other leakages. 
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1.1.4 Disparity in Pension Benefits in the Formal Sector 
 
Pensions are as incentives for workers to stay on with the same employer especially 
in a DB scheme where benefits are based on the final salary (Barr & Diamond, 2006).  
The disparity in the pension benefits is glaringly in favour of employees in the public 
sector. The CSPS is a non-contributory, lifelong protection in old age with substantial 
medical benefits while the Employees Provident Fund (EPF)15 is savings returned 
with some interest (Narayanan, 2002). How does this disparity affect the 
sustainability of the CSPS?  The public sector wages are comparable to the private 
sector in most instances (Manaf, 2010) but wage increments in the former are not 
linked to productivity, unlike the private sector (Narayanan, 2012).  Furthermore, 
various allowances offered to the public sector employees are exempted from income 
tax whereas similar allowances received in the private sector are taxable16. Given that 
this offers a clear advantage to  public sector employees “any further advantages 
through [differences in] pension” is “unjustified compensation differential and 
unnecessarily increase[s] the cost of government” (Palacios & Whitehouse, 2006: 41).  
 
The CSPS covers only 10 percent of the labour force but takes out a large portion of 
the revenue in pension payments (12.3 percent in 2013), whereas the EPF 
beneficiaries comprise 50 percent of the labour force (Holzmann, 2014), but are made 
responsible for their own old age income. The problem of ageing in Malaysia may 
require more expenditure to be funneled to medical aid for the elderly, in general, 
                                               
15 A comparison of the EPF and the CSPS is provided in Chapter 2.  
16 A super scale officer in the government sector could receive various allowances totaling up to 
RM63, 700 or more per year that would be exempted from income tax. The entire sum will be 
taxable if it is received by a private sector employee. 
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making the maintenance of such a wide disparity between public and private sector 
employees an unduly expensive exercise.  
 
This disparity also affects the smooth functioning of the labour market by limiting the 
inter sector mobility of workers. The CSPS’s long eligibility (vesting17) period 
restricts the mobility of workers and thus retards the economic flexibility that is 
necessary for labour adjustments during economic shocks or structural changes. This 
too adds to the cost of government in maintaining workers until the eligibility period 
is fulfilled.  
 
1.1.5 Institutional Capacity 
 
One of the key issues of pension reform is the availability of institutional capacity to 
administer and implement a new scheme. Administrative issues such as the 
introduction of personal accounts and tracking of contributions require some 
administrative preparedness (Holzmann & Hinz, 2005). In Malaysia, the government 
had initiated a pre-funding scheme to ease its burden in the future with the 
establishment of KWAP. It is clearly outlined in the KWAP annual report of 2013 
that this organization is meant to assist the Federal Government in paying the pension 
liability. The functions of KWAP are clearly stipulated as policy setting for the 
pension fund, managing the collections of individual contributions, executing and 
monitoring investments, managing members’ accounts and managing financial 
administration and payments (KWAP, 2013). 
                                               
17 One is able to benefit from the pension after fulfilling certain years of service. This is explained 
further in Chapter 2 for CSPS.  
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The institutional framework is therefore available to make a shift for public 
employees towards contributing to the pension fund. The current pre-funding that 
comes only from the employer may not be sufficient to cope with the increase in the 
number of retirees. The pension has a statutory claim on government revenue and, as 
such, it is independent of the economic performance and capacity of the tax payer. 
Since, in Malaysia, the wages in the public sector is almost comparable to the private 
sector, some amount of contribution from the employees could enhance the capacity 
of the fund to finance pension payments in the future.  
 
1.2  Problem Statement 
 
The discussions above suggests that a number of pressures like rising life expectancy, 
growing number of pension recipients, government employment policies,  poor fiscal 
position, and the disparity in pension benefits that affects labour market efficiency— 
all add up to a case for civil service pension reform to ensure sustainability of the 
pension scheme. Many of these issues can be addressed through appropriate reform 
measures. This provides the motivation for the present study. Its purpose is to examine 
CSPS and identify the issues that affect its sustainability. It is a normative study that 
hopes to provide some insights on improving the CSPS. 
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1.3  Research Questions  
 
More specifically, the study proposes to address the following research questions: 
1. Are there factors in the current CSPS that adversely affect its long term 
sustainability? 
2. To what extent is the present scheme of pensions financially sustainable in the 
long term?  
3. How can the system be changed or improved to lower the pension deficit and 
make it more sustainable? 
 
1.4  Objectives of the Study 
 
Based on the research questions, the main objectives of the study are as follows:  
1. To describe the existing CSPS in Malaysia and to identify factors, if any, that 
is likely to adversely affect its long term financial sustainability. 
2. To assess its long run financial sustainability by measuring both the size of 
the yearly pension deficit and yearly financial gap. 
3. To examine measures to reduce the pension deficit and provide 
recommendations to improve its long term sustainability. 
 
1.5  Significance of the Study 
 
Despite this rising concern regarding the financial sustainability of the CSPS, few 
studies have examined its structure or discussed the possible consequences. Previous 
studies on the CSPS have briefly highlighted its rising cost (Lee, 1997) and the impact 
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of increasing retirement age on pension liability from 1991 to 2000 (Ibrahim & Siri, 
2012). In short, there is no study that gives a comprehensive review of the civil service 
pension or that has sought to ascertain the sustainability of the system in the midst of 
the expected demographic, economic and socio-economic changes. Neither has there 
been any attempt to estimate the extent of the pension deficit nor how it is likely to 
grow in the future. This study therefore intends to fill the gap. The evaluation of the 
current pension system undertaken through this study would hopefully contribute to 
a better understanding of the CSPS by providing a clearer picture of its current 
structure, its weaknesses and measures to reduce the financial burden posed by it. It 
will also identify policies that can improve the financial sustainability of the pension 
scheme. 
 
1.6 Scope of the Study 
 
This scope of this study is limited to the civil service pension scheme which is one of 
the two largest old age security schemes in the country; the other is the Employees 
Provident fund. The former covers the employees of all public sector services while 
the latter covers largely workers in the  private sector. There are other smaller schemes 
such as the Armed Forces Pension (LTAT) which are not discussed. The Private 
Retirement Scheme and the Basic State Scheme are also not discussed. The former is 
akin to a voluntary, individual savings scheme while the latter is still under discussion. 
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1.7  Organization of Study 
 
The study is organized as follows: Chapter 1 provided the background to the research 
topic, identified the research questions, the objectives and the significance of the 
research. Chapter 2 provides a description of the CSPS from its origins and traces the 
changes it has undergone to evolve into its present form. It also discusses the disparity 
in pension provisions in the formal sector by comparing both EPF and CSPS. Chapter 
3 reviews the literatures and provides explanations to the various concepts, the models 
of pension systems and compares reforms in other Asian countries and United 
Kingdom. The implications for Malaysia’s CSPS reforms are also highlighted. 
Chapter 4 presents the framework and model that is used to evaluate the sustainability 
of the current pension system. Chapter 5 discusses the results, and the final chapter 
looks into the policy implications of the findings and suggests recommendations for 
reforms. 
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CHAPTER 2 
MALAYSIAN CIVIL SERVICE PENSION SCHEME (CSPS) 
 
2.0  Introduction 
 
This chapter gives an overview of the pension design in Malaysia and traces the 
evolution the Civil Service Pension Scheme (CSPS). It highlights the changes that 
have taken place and the changes that failed to take off. It also discusses the disparity 
between the private sector pension scheme and the CSPS. 
 
2.1  Pension System Design in Malaysia 
 
The pension system design refers to the basic structure of the pension system and its 
characteristics. It shows how the system fits into the multi-pillar framework of the 
World Bank and to what extent it is integrated with the other pension systems in the 
country (Pallares-Miralles, Romero and Whitehouse, 2012) 
 
2.1.1  Pension System Design against the World Bank Framework 
 
Table 2.1 gives an illustration of the overall social security framework in Malaysia 
set against the World Bank pillars. The World Bank multi-pillar model is designed to 
meet the needs of various target groups, including the lifetime poor, informal sector 
workers and workers covered by formal pensions. The diversity provides more 
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flexibility in meeting the needs of the various groups and is also able to cope better 
against demographic, economic and political risks. The five pillars are: 
 
2.1.1(a)  A Non- Contributory or “Zero Pillar”   
 
This pillar is financed by the government with the objective of alleviating poverty. It 
is a minimal provision for the elderly to ensure that those with low lifetime income 
and those who participated marginally in the formal economy are given basic 
protection. This scheme is highly dependent on budgetary resources. In Malaysia, the 
zero-pillar is fragmented and is based on a case- to- case basis. Malaysia does not 
have a universal pension for the elderly.  
 
2.1.1(b) A Mandatory “First Pillar” 
 
The objective of this pillar is to smoothen out consumption by replacing some of the 
income previously earned prior to retirement, and to alleviate poverty. This pillar is 
aimed at meeting the risks of uncertainties in life expectancy. It can either be financed 
through a ‘pay as you go’ scheme, or be fully funded.  But it is subject to demographic 
or political risks. It is a public pension plan, either with a defined benefit (DB) or 
defined contribution (DC), or a Notional Defined Contribution Scheme (NDC). It is 
based on contribution and linked to earnings. The CSPS fits Pillar 1 of the World 
Bank model that is mandated and financed from public revenue and provides benefits 
for old age, disability, and derivative pension. It covers about 10 percent of the labour 
force (cited in Holzmann, 2014), comprising of employees of the Federal and State 
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governments, statutory and local authorities, attorney general’s office, and police and 
military personnel who have served for more than 21 years.  
 
2.1.1(c) A Mandatory “Second Pillar” 
 
This pillar is also aimed at consumption smoothening and alleviating poverty in old 
age. It can either be a DB or a DC scheme. It is more of an occupational plan. The 
Employees Provident Fund (EPF) is a mandatory old age retirement fund for the 
private sector, with both employees and employers contributing to the fund. The 
LTAT (Armed Forces Fund) is a DC scheme for military personnel below officers’ 
level, with both employer and employee contributing to the fund.  
 
2.1.1(d) A Voluntary “Third Pillar” 
 
It is meant for consumption smoothening for both the formal and informal sectors. It 
can be carried out as an occupational or personal plan. Participation is on a voluntary 
basis and the source of funding is from personal contribution. The Private Retirement 
Scheme (PRC), set up in 2012, acts as a voluntary scheme to help address the needs 
of an ageing population in the future.  
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Table 2.1 Social Protection Programmes in Malaysia Compared against the World Bank     
                Pillars 
World Bank Pillar Social Protection in Malaysia 
Zero Pillar  
Elderly Poverty Protection            No universal protection for the poor 
 
Target Group : Lifetime poor, informal and formal 
sector 
 
           Those with no source of income or no financial 
support from family         
Characteristics: Basic’ or ‘Social Pension’ or 
‘Social Assistance’; Universal of means tested 
           Old Age Assistance: RM300 monthly cash  
benefit 
           Protection at Home Care: Rumah Seri 
Kenangan 
 
Funding: Budget/ general revenue            Determined by the Department of Social 
Welfare,    Ministry of Women, Family and 
Community Development 
 
1st Pillar  
Elderly poverty protection and consumption 
smoothing 
 
          CSPS 
Target Group: Formal Group 
 
         For pensionable public sector employees only 
Characteristics: Public pension plan, publicly 
managed, defined benefit or notional defined 
contribution 
Mandated 
 
     Life-long pension payment with defined 
benefits,  disability pension, gratuity, 
derivatives pension 
 
Funding: Contributions,  and perhaps with 
financial reserves 
          No contribution from employees 
          Financed from tax revenue (budget) 
Administered by Public Service and Post 
Service    Department and KWAP 
 
2nd Pillar  
Consumption smoothing and elderly poverty 
protection through minimum pension 
 
          EPF and LTAT 
Target: Formal sector 
Mandated 
 
          EPF for private sector employees 
          LTAT for armed forces of other ranks 
Characteristics: Occupational or personal pension 
plans, fully funded defined benefit or fully funded 
defined contribution 
 
           EPF : contributed by both employer and  
employees 
           LTAT: contributed by both employer and 
employees 
 
Funding: Financial assets 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          Both are funded 
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Table 2.1. Continued 
 
3rd Pillar  
Consumption smoothing          Private Retirement Scheme (PRS) 
 
Target group: lifetime poor, Formal and informal 
sector 
(emphasis on formal and informal) 
Voluntary 
 
         On voluntary basis 
Characteristics: Occupational or personal pension 
plans, partially or fully funded defined benefit or 
funded defined contribution 
 
         Contributory 
Funding: Financial assets 
 
Funded 
4th Pillar  
Elderly poverty protection and consumption 
smoothing 
(emphasis on lifetime poor and informal sector but 
also includes formal sector) 
Individual savings and insurance 
          Individuals and family members 
           Tithing through Islamic institutions e.g. 
Department of Islamic Development Malaysia 
(JAKIM) for needy Muslims 
 
Target group: Lifetime poor both formal and 
informal sector 
          Lifetime poor from formal and informal sector 
Characteristics: voluntary or access to informal 
support (e.g. family support) or formal social 
programs) 
          Individuals and family members 
           Tithing through Islamic Institutions: Zakat for 
needy Muslims by Department of Islamic 
Development Malaysia (JAKIM) 
Funding: Individual savings and insurance 
 
          Savings, insurance or family member or Zakat. 
Sources: Sim and Hamid (2010), Holzmann et.al (2008), Holzmann (2014), KWAP 
(2013)  
Note: Zakat is compulsory for all Muslims and as such some hold the view that Zakat does not fit into 
the 4th Pillar which is voluntary but rather it is similar to Zero Pillar which is universal for all Muslims.  
 
2.1.1(e) A Voluntary “Fourth Pillar” 
 
This is an informal support aimed at elderly poverty protection and consumption 
smoothing on voluntary basis.  
 
In the Malaysian case, at least in terms of coverage and intention, the zero, third and 
fourth pillars have not fully met the aspirations behind the World Bank framework. 
The implementation of the first and second pillars, on the other hand, merits 
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revaluation to make them more sustainable. The focus of this study is on how to 
ensure the sustainability of the first pillar.  
 
2.2  Malaysian Civil Service Structure 
 
The Malaysian Civil Service in Malaysia consists of both Federal and State level 
employees, and can be traced back to the British influence in Malaysia through more 
than 100 years of administrative rule from 1824 to 1957 (Manaf, 2010). The Federal 
level consists of ministries and departments while the state level comprises local 
government and local administrators. The employees can be divided into 2 categories: 
(i) managerial and professional and (ii) support groups. The following table briefly 
describes the structure of the civil service workforce. 
 
Table 2.2 Civil Service Workforce Structure 
Categories Group Qualification 
 
 
 
Managerial and Professional  
Premier Civil Service  
(JUSA- Jawatan Utama Sektor 
Awam) 
 
Promoted from professional 
and managerial group 
 
Professional and management 
(service officers) 
 
 
University Degree 
 
 
Support Groups 
 
Support group 1 
 
College diploma and high 
school degree 
 
 
Support Group 2 
 
 
Secondary school cert and 
lower school cert 
 
Source: Manaf (2010) 
Notes: The Premier Civil service category includes the rank of ‘Tulus’. 
 
The public service encompasses the (i) judicial and legal services (ii) the police force 
(iii) education service (iv) armed forces (v) public service of states (vi) the joint public 
service (Federal and State), and (vii) general public service of the Federation. The 
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bulk of the employees are from the support groups, comprising almost 70.3 percent 
of employees, followed by the professional and management staff who account for 
28.2 percent, with the remaining 1.5 percent being made up of  those in the ‘super 
scales’ or JUSA category (JPA, 2012).  
 
The recruitment quotas for the administrative elite were introduced in 1952 and have 
continued till the present. As such, the Malaysian Civil service has majority of Malays 
(Manaf, 2010). Even more Malays occupy the higher level positions of the civil 
service after the NEP (New Economic Policy) was introduced in 1970 (Khoo, 2005). 
By mid- 2005, Malays accounted for about 77 percent of the civil service (CPPS, 
2006). The proportion has remained largely at that level and includes places reserved 
in the civil service for other indigenous groups from Sabah and Sarawak. Malays and 
these groups are collectively termed the ‘Bumiputera’. 
 
The Public Service Department (JPA) is the main agency for human resources in the 
public sector and it is under the purview of the Prime Minister’s Department.  The 
selection and recruitment in the public sector is carried out by the Public Service 
Commission (PSC). The National Institute for Public Administration (INTAN), 
founded in 1972, is responsible for the training and development of the public sector 
employees.  
 
In 1992, a ‘performance based reward system’, the National Remuneration Scheme 
(NRS), was introduced. The salary structure was known as the Matrix Salary 
Schedule and applied to all, except JUSA. It allowed three movements of salary 
scales— horizontal, vertical or diagonal. Those whose performance did not qualify 
